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ABSTRACT FOR ELECTRONIC FORMAT 
 
This chapter explores changing approaches to material culture in the history of science 
and ways that archaeology and the history of science have served each other in the 
assessment of historical evidence. Historians have increasingly explored the role of the 
body, instruments, models, and other materials in the history of science, and use material 
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re-enactments to learn more about past scientific practices. This work offers 
archaeologists opportunities to better understand archaeological assessments of evidence. 
Archaeology in turn offers new ways for historians of science to appreciate the material 
dimension of science and the places where it is practiced. 
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Historians of science interested in material culture, among whom I would count myself, 
often gripe about the tendency of other historians to present science as if it was really all 
about theory, a history of ideas and great geniuses, when really material culture and 
practice are essential to scientific practice. I assumed, given that material culture is the 
focus, that archaeologists would share this gripe. So I was surprised to read on the first 
page of Colin Renfrew and Paul Bahn’s textbook Archaeology Essentials: Theories, 
Methods, and Practice, ‘The history of archeology is… in the first instance a history of 
ideas, of theory, of ways of looking at the past’ (Renfrew and Bahn, 2007: 13). For a 
discipline so powerfully evocative of material culture to a novice like me, it was a 
surprise to find that objects did not figure in this defining statement. Historians of science 
would today strongly disagree with such an interpretation. They would want to say that 
ideas and theory are not the only or even principal feature of any science, especially not 
archaeology!  
 
This is not meant as a rant against archaeology textbooks, but more as an illustration of 
what the history of science might bring to the table for archeologists. I think the approach 
of historians of science offers a careful, detailed and ultimately empirical understanding 
of the history of archeology which avoids grand narratives of continual progress and the 
evolution of a properly scientific attitude in the discipline. Some studies, such as those of 
Knossos and the Tomb of Agamemnon by Cathy Gere, have already demonstrated the 
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richness of integrating the two disciplines (Gere 2007; Gere 2011). At the same time, it is 
abundantly clear that the history of science has plenty to learn from archeology. In recent 
times, historians have become increasingly interested in the history of the material 
dimensions of scientific practice and in the use of material culture as a source for 
historical inquiry. But if historians have embraced material culture as evidence, they have 
only done so with a relatively limited disciplinary repertoire, which archaeology could 
greatly enrich. This chapter charts how the history of science has engaged with material 
culture, and considers how archeological perspectives might expand this approach for 
both the history of science and the history of archeology. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief exploration of how historians of science shifted from a 
focus on intellectual history to an interest in the material culture of science in the last 
decades of the twentieth century. Subsequent sections explore areas of material culture of 
particular interest to historians of science, and how these have revealed new insights into 
the nature of scientific evidence and the changing conditions by which evidence is 
identified, judged, and assessed. Historians have explored the role of the human body in 
making knowledge and have used re-enactments and re-stagings of past experiments to 
reveal this. They have investigated how instruments and models came to be regarded (or 
disregarded) as legitimate sources of scientific evidence, and they have opened up studies 
of the more general roles material culture play in the sciences. The chapter then turns to 
an exploration of archeological studies of scientific material culture and identifies some 
of the ways archaeology might contribute to extending the use of materials as evidence in 
the history of science. 
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FROM THE HISTORY OF IDEAS TO EMBODIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Historians of science have always been interested in material culture, but encouraged a 
more idealist image of science in the middle decades of the twentieth century which the 
discipline is now trying to move away from. Some of the earliest histories of science 
considered the material conditions of scientific production. In the eighteenth century, the 
chemist Joseph Priestley made experiment the object of historical inquiry, cataloguing 
past experiments in electricity and optics to avoid future research repeating past studies 
(Christie 1990: 9-10). In the nineteenth century, historians of science included regular 
references to scientific apparatus in their works, while museum curators exhibited on the 
history of instruments (Whewell 1837; Anon. 1876).  
 
While curators remained interested in scientific instruments, some historians of science 
took a more idealist turn in the twentieth century. For some, the Cold War politicized 
questions about the place of the material in science. In the revolutionary turmoil of the 
1920s, the Russian physicist Boris Hessen proposed that scientific theories, in this case 
Isaac Newton’s theory of gravitation, should be understood as products of the economic 
and social conditions prevailing in a particular time and place, reflecting the Marxist view 
that culture is a superstructural product of the conditions of production (Hessen 1931). 
Russian Marxists inspired admirers and critics in the West. Critics countered with an  
‘internalist’ history of ideas in which scientific theories and ideas predominated. 
Alexander Koyré, a former White soldier in the Russian revolution and a leading light in 
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this more intellectual history, dismissed the Marxist view, ‘I do not see what the scientia 
activa has ever had to do with the development of the calculus, nor the rise of the 
bourgeoisie with that of the Copernican, or the Keplerian, astronomy’ (Koyré 1968: 6). 
Ultimately, the progress of ideas was the real key to the history of science. 
 
This emphasis on the history of ideas endured in the history of science through the 1970s. 
Change came as historians looked to new resources in sociology and anthropology which 
revived more contextual and social understandings of science recalling those of the 
Marxists earlier in the century. These inspired more interest in material culture and the 
study of science as a physical, embodied practice. One resource for this was the 
‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’ (SSK) arising in the 1970s, which emphasized the 
ways theories and artifacts were socially constructed by the needs and expectations of 
communities of interacting users and makers (Law 2010). Some strands of SSK lent 
particular importance to material culture and practice as evidence. While historians’ 
evidence base often remained exclusively textual, sociologists went to laboratories and 
observed scientists as a practice (Latour 1987; Pickering 1992). Historians inspired by 
SSK followed suite by paying more attention to the physical contexts of past science, 
wedding this to sociological interpretations of scientific change. For example, in 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer explored the rise 
of experimental science through the career of a seventeenth-century scientific instrument, 
the air-pump of Robert Boyle, and controversies over its value to science (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985). 
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By the late 1980s, material culture had become a more significant focus for historians of 
science. In this period, an interest in the context of scientific activity grew into the 
‘spatial turn’, exploring the physical locations and conditions of knowledge-making in 
laboratories, museums, the field and other sites (Shapin and Ophir 1991; Livingstone 
2003). The spatial turn stressed that ideas and theories should be understood as always 
being embodied in material objects, from human bodies to books, papers, instruments, 
and other ‘immutable mobiles’ as sociologist Bruno Latour called them (Law 2010: 181-
2). From this point of view, science is less a collection of abstract notions and concepts 
emerging from the minds of individuals, than a concrete, collective practice of producing, 
assessing, and circulating material objects designated as carriers of natural knowledge. 
By the close of the twentieth century, then, many historians came to see science as an 
embodied practice involving primarily the manipulation of things. 
 
BODIES OF EVIDENCE 
 
One of the most important things which do science is the human body, and much recent 
history of science has been concerned with the role of the body in scientific practice. 
Bodies are stores of information, gestures, and skills learned over many hundreds or 
thousands of hours, and ingrained into nerves, muscles and bones. Historically, epistemic 
judgments have been radically shaped by the capacties and judgments of the human body. 
As Shapin and Christopher Lawrence have argued, the body of knowledge-makers is 
intimately tied to their identity, and hence their reliability as truth-tellers, while ‘The 
bodily identity of the truth-seeker undoubtedly varies from culture to culture and from 
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time to time within a culture’ (Lawrence and Shapin 1998: 10; Schaffer 1994). The 
credibility of past evidence hinges on the credibility of those who assess it, and their 
credit hinges, in part, on their self-representation through bodily form, acts and 
appearances. The most obvious instance in which embodiment has been linked to 
epistemic authority is the case of women, who for centuries were excluded from science 
on the grounds that their bodies disabled them from being reliable truth-tellers in 
comparison to men (Schiebinger 1989). Male credibility also varied according to bodily 
forms and gestures. Asceticism, signalled through bodily acts of physical restraint, was 
long taken to mark a willed disengagement from the world and was associated with the 
reliable knower, in the figure of the hermit, the chaste or temperate scholar, or the self-
effacing seeker of objectivity (Shapin 1998; Daston and Galison 2007: 191-252).  
 
Identifying the embodied nature of evidential assessments has been accompanied by 
innovative ways of making history more performative. Historians of science now 
increasingly share with  archaeology an interest in re-stagings and re-enactments of past 
practices as a source of evidence for enriching historical understanding. The extent of 
these practices has been much greater in archaeology than in history of science. While 
archaeologists routinely use ethnoarchaeology and ethnographic analogy to see how past 
techniques might have been achieved, historians of science have only begun relatively 
recently to engage in similar investigations.  
 
The epistemic status of this work differs in history of science compared to archaeology. 
While archaeologists have typically framed re-enactments as scientific experiments, 
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occurring within science as a means of increasing knowledge of the past, historians have 
for the most part framed their re-enactments as historical inquiries into the nature of 
science itself. Re-enactments in the history of science have a long history (Chang 2011). 
In the 1960s, Thomas B. Settle of Cornell University investigated Galileo’s theories of 
motion by restaging his experiments (Settle 1961). In the 1990s, Peter Heering used 
replications to study Coulomb’s inverse-square law (Heering 2006; Heering and Witje 
2011). Since the early 1990s, H. Otto Sibum has restaged numerous physics experiments 
from the past including those undertaken by the Manchester physicist James Joule in the 
mid-nineteenth century to calculate the mechanical equivalent of heat (Sibum 1995). 
Working from a replica of Joule’s apparatus and performing careful re-stagings of Joule’s 
experiments, Sibum revealed how skills were needed to make the experiment succeed 
which were not widely distributed among contemporary physicists, but which Joule 
obtained through his experience as a brewer (his family owned and ran a brewery in 
Manchester). Sibum has highlighted the essential role of ‘gestural knowledge’ in science, 
or ‘the complex of skills and forms of mastery developed in… real-time performances’ in 
experimentation, and the diverse communities that such knowledge might come from 
(Sibum 1995: 76). He also reveals an important tension in innovative experiments 
between the highly individualized skills that may be necessary to make new experiments 
succeed (in this case Joule’s skills as a brewer) and the need for experiments to be 
sufficiently deskilled to allow them to be replicated by anyone in the scientific 
community. For those who could not replicate Joule’s embodied skills, his experiment 
did not count as evidence of a mechanical equivalent of heat.  
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More recently, historians of chemistry and alchemy have turned to re-stagings to make 
sense of complex chemical and alchemical processes from the past. Jenny Rampling, 
Lawrence Principe and William Newman, for example, have explored chemical processes 
and reactions that may have lay behind the recipes of renaissance and early modern 
alchemical texts (Principe 1987; Principe 2012). Once an historian is able to witness 
alchemical processes re-created in the laboratory, they argue, the intentional obscurities 
of alchemical writing may be more easily judged and deciphered. Alternatively, Hasok 
Chang has used the restaging of past experiments to recover lost knowledge and to 
explore directions for scientific experiments which earlier investigators may not have 
taken, an approach Chang calls ‘complementary science’ (Chang 2004). The emphasis on 
the material in historiography has thus translated into a growing practical engagement 
with material evidence as a source for historical research, beyond the traditional emphasis 
on using texts. 
 
INSTRUMENTS AND MODELS 
 
This historical work shows that in the sciences, evidence needs to be both engaged with 
the body to be credible and appropriately distanced from it. The body is necessary to 
make evidence, but if evidence is too embodied in the scientist, or the scientist’s body is 
considered problematic in some way, then the evidence cannot count. This is also 
apparent in the use of instruments. While historians agonized over the relative merits of 
intellectual and material history in the late twentieth century, curators working on the 
history of scientific instruments were already very familiar with issues of material culture 
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and questions of practice and evidence (Van Helden and Hankins 1994; Taub 2011). As 
interest in material culture grew, so this work became more integrated into the history of 
science. This work demonstrated that like the body itself, the integrity of instruments 
plays a critical role in assessments of evidence. What counts as evidence depends on 
different notions of what count as valid instruments, and how those instruments interact 
with the bodies of their users. These could differ radically in the past from today. In the 
seventeenth century, ‘philosophical’ instruments such as the telescope, microscope, and 
air-pump were adopted in the sciences because they were viewed as extensions to the 
senses that would allow humans to restore the extraordinary perceptive powers of Adam 
and Eve in the Garden of Eden before the Fall (Harrison 2002). Throughout the 
seventeenth century, debates raged about the validity of instruments as sources of 
scientific knowledge. Critics rejected the status of microscopic evidence as scientific on 
the grounds that simply magnifying objects taught nothing about human values, the 
essential feature of any investigation claiming to be a science (Wilson 1988).  
 
The legitimacy of evidence obtained by instruments is closely related to judgments of the 
capacities of the human body. In their history of objectivity, Lorraine Daston and Peter 
Galison have shown how instruments came to be seen in the nineteenth century as a way 
to remove the body, understood as a repository of weaknesses, personal prejudices and 
idiosyncrasies, from experimental inquiry. But even this ‘mechanical objectivity’ did not 
endure as a credible approach in the sciences (Daston and Galison 2007). In recognition 
that the human senses could never be entirely removed from acts of observation, some 
scientists sought to exclude representations and observations entirely from science, in 
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favour of logic and mathematics. Others settled on ‘trained judgment’ or an appropriately 
disciplined bodily engagement in acts of observation and experimentation, bringing a 
human expertise into combination with instrumental renderings of natural phenomena. 
Evidential assessments thus depended on changing ideas of the appropriate interrelation 
of the body, instruments and objects, and the relative credibility of their different 
configurations. How these configurations are judged will depend on changing local social 
contexts and interests. 
 
One consequence of the rise of historical studies interested in materials and practice has 
been to expand the definition of what counts as scientific material culture well beyond the 
traditional focus on scientific instruments. Models, for example, have been the subject of 
many recent studies. Archaeologists have long employed scale models of buildings, 
ships, cities, sites and excavations to make better sense of them for professionals and the 
public. Historians dismissed models for a long time as mere teaching aids or museum 
displays, but as Soraya de Chadarevian and Nick Hopwood have shown recently, 
scientific models have moved constantly between contexts of research, display, and 
education and are often crucial to all three (Chadarevian and Hopwood 2004; Maerker 
2011; Bud 2013). 
 
Like scientific instruments, the status of models as legitimate sources of evidence has 
been widely debated in history (Schaffer 2004a). Christopher Evans has drawn attention 
to the fragility of archaeological models as a form of evidence (Evans 2004). A large 
watercolour of a ‘druidical temple’ at Mont St Helier, Jersey belonging to nineteenth-
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century architect Sir John Soane was likely made not from the original site but by 
copying a model held in the Society of Antiquaries. Evans asks how many other early 
images of sites of ancient remains were made from models rather than from life? 
Rusticated textures on stone may be more to do with the cork used to make models than 
textures on the original stones. Models often existed ambiguously between objective 
representations and entertaining spectacles in the nineteenth century, deploying lighting 
effects, magic lantern projections and paintings to give atmosphere and presence to the 
representation of a site. Models remained prominent in archaeological conference 
presentations into the twentieth century, shifting from representations of ancient 
buildings or stone to models of excavations and then reconstructions. Models mediated 
archaeology to the public, but may also have served to legitimate concepts of evidence in 
archaeological practice. Pitt Rivers had more than a hundred wooden models of his 
excavations constructed for public education, and Evans supposes their unprecedented 
attention to detail reflected, and helped promote, Pitt Rivers’ demand for the use of a 
broader range of evidence in archaeology.  
 
The history of instruments and models demonstrates how the legitimacy of different 
forms of material culture as evidence in a science may take much time and effort to 
establish. Lorraine Daston has proposed that a feature of scientific objects is that they are 
partly defined by the duration and difficulty of constituting them as legitimate objects of 
inquiry. Daston contrasts the solid ‘quotidian’ objects of common experience, which 
‘possess the self-evidence of a slap in the face’ with ‘scientific objects’, typically 
unfamiliar entities such as atoms, genes, or forces, which take a long time to capture and 
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may or may not prove enduring as things (Daston 2000: 2). More often perhaps, objects 
may be simultaneously quotidian and scientific, physically robust but fragile in their 
status as evidence of a theory or interpretation. 
 
NATURE, ARTIFICE AND CULTURE 
 
Historical inquiry thus reveals how the apparently straightforward status of materials and 
objects as evidence may not have always been so obvious. Another place where this 
becomes apparent is the boundary between the natural and the artificial, of crucial 
significance in archaeology. It is a boundary that historians have shown to be changing 
constantly in history (Newman and Bernadette Bensaud-Vincent 2007). A striking case is 
provided by a cameo examined by the German monk Albertus Magnus in the thirteenth 
century, depicting the carefully sculpted heads of two Romans in plumed helmets. As 
Lorraine Daston has pointed out, while the cameo appears to us as an obviously human 
artifact, Albertus took it to be a natural object, a product of the personified deity Nature at 
play (Daston 1998). To see it in this way entailed belonging to a Christian, European 
culture in which the natural world was the production of a deified Nature acting as vice-
regent to the creator God. Cameos, crystals, fossils and other objects were identified as 
exceptional ‘jokes’ which Nature created when not producing the normal realm of things 
(Findlen 1990). Different times and cultures thus draw the boundary of artifice and nature 
differently. Today changing boundaries are signalled by debates over objects which seem 
to lie ambiguously between the natural and artificial, such as genetically-engineered 
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organisms, artificial intelligence, or, in the case of archaeology, the ‘geofacts’ at Pedra 
Furada in South America (Meltzer 1995). 
 
Recognizing the very different ways that material objects have appeared to scientific 
inquiry in the past was the goal of a 2004 collection of essays edited by Lorraine Daston 
entitled Things That Talk, which expanded historical studies from a focus on the 
instruments of scientific inquiry to a broader exploration of certain classes of ‘things’ in 
general (Daston 2004). Daston and her collaborators sought in this work to reveal how 
objects could be the source of multiple meanings and cultural significances, emerging in 
particular historical moments as evocative and fascinating artifacts. Daston is especially 
interested in things which bridge the divide between those prompting a singular, 
unproblematic ‘positivist’ understanding and those deemed open to endless interpretation, 
between ‘evidence’ and ‘idol’ as she puts it. Such things, with examples including 
photographs, bubbles, Rorschach tests, and glass flowers, are shown to have evoked new 
debates and ideas to the degree that their ‘thingness’ or materiality did not fit into 
preconceived boundaries and sensibilities. Bubbles, for example, were transformed in the 
late nineteenth century from transient things into fixed commodities, objects of 
knowledge, and icons of visual culture. They ‘talked’ by evoking not only the facts of 
their constitution but also the renderings of artists, entrepreneurs, and engineers (Schaffer 
2004b). 
 
Things That Talk was representative of a new direction in the history of science away 
from the study of the instruments of science and towards the study of science as one 
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among a variety of artistic, commercial, and technical material cultures. Another work 
which has been important for developing this approach is the 2010 collection Materials 
and Expertise in Early Modern Science, edited by Ursula Klein and Emma Spary (Klein 
and Spary 2010; Klein and Lefevre 2007). Like Things That Talk, Klein and Spary’s 
collection evokes the diverse meanings given to substances in history, and stresses their 
location at the intersection of multiple discourses and practices. The authors examine 
how substances such as dyes, ceramics, milk, ink, spa-water, and gunpowder formed the 
focus of new interactions between government, the market, consumers and the sciences in 
the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, constituting new hybrids of expertise and reshaping 
knowledge. The approach of this work and Daston’s Things That Talk has not been 
without its critics. The historians and curators Thomas Söderqvist and Adam Bencard 
have criticized Daston for approaching material objects as ‘talking’, which, even if not 
meant literally, shifts the focus from the physical to the semiotic in accounting for 
material objects. This does objects’ materiality a disservice by studying it as nothing 
more than a special version of a text (Soderqvist and Bencard 2010). Nevertheless, the 
material turn which Daston, Klein, Spary and others have initiated represents a significant 
shift in the way historians of science have related to material culture. 
 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND MATERIAL HISTORIES OF SCIENCE 
 
Lest it appear that historians have had a lot to say about material culture, it is worth 
stressing that a great deal of work in the discipline remains focused on the history of 
ideas, while most of those who have engaged with material culture (including myself) 
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have tended to do so by reading about things rather than engaging with them directly. 
This is certainly not true of all studies. Museologically-inspired work on scientific 
instruments, for example, has a long tradition of working with objects (Bennett 1987; 
Bud 2013). But actual physical and material objects and their properties have not been 
used as evidence in the history of science as much as might be wished. This is where, I 
will argue in this final section, archaeology offers great resources for historians to expand 
their engagements with materials. 
 
Archaeology itself contributed much to the history of science in the twentieth century, 
particularly in excavations of chemical and alchemical sites in the post-war era. These 
include the castle of Oberstockstall in Austria, the Louvre in Paris, and the Old 
Ashmolean in Oxford (Osten 1998; Rouaze 1989; Bennett, Johnston and Simcock 2000; 
Moorhouse 1972; Anderson 2000; Martinón-Torres 2007). This has revealed information 
which complements historical research and has offered new insights which textual studies 
alone could not provide. Scholars such as Robert Anderson have pointed out the value of 
archaeology in this regard. While drawings and architectural plans can show the situation 
and arrangement of laboratory spaces, excavations reveal the range and nature of 
instruments, apparatus, and substances in use inside them (Klein 2008: 775-77). 
Excavated instruments may also speak of practice in ways that texts cannot. Looking at 
material objects directly avoids the problem that textual descriptions may be inaccurate 
because they were copied and distorted over many years. Texts might also be deliberately 
obscure, as in the case of alchemy. Texts often lack details of structure and process that a 
direct experience of apparatus makes evident (Anderson 2000: 24). Objects, unlike texts, 
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can reveal their location of origin, showing how materials circulated around Europe (or 
the world) at different times. The locations of objects also make apparent the kinds of 
places where they were in use (as Anderson notes, alchemical vessels have typically 
appeared in excavations of glass-houses, castles, and monasteries, which might not have 
otherwise been obviously scientific sites) (Anderson 2000: 18). Archaeology reveals 
further useful information depending on what it fails to find. If certain objects are scarce 
it may be because they were not as extensively utilized as historians might have thought, 
based on the textual record. The lack of metal objects in excavations of alchemical 
apparatus, despite their evident frequency in alchemical texts, suggests that metals were 
melted down and recycled, whereas glass was cheap enough to throw away and ceramics 
could not be used again if substances fused into them (Anderson 2000: 25).  
 
The relationship of history of science and archaeology will change as historians and 
archaeologists reconsider what count as scientific sites. Anderson points out that an 
adequate history of the chemical laboratory should include not only alchemical or 
chemical research laboratories but also places of chemical production, testing, and 
teaching (Anderson 2013: 671-2). Then studies of excavations showing, for example, 
evidence of glass production for pharmaceutical vessels in Fustat in Cairo become 
relevant to a history of chemical laboratories, taking that history back much further than 
is normally the case (Scanlon and Pinder-Wilson 2001; Bacharach 2002). Archaeology 
may also help to manifest the degree to which past scientific spaces were adapted from 
existing buildings, changing conceptions of what counts as a scientific space. Kitchens, 
bedrooms, and cellars in homes in addition to chapels and barracks have all been adapted 
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to undertake experimental research. Excavations might provide evidence of other adapted 
spaces (Anderson 2013: 673; Werrett 2013). 
 
Archaeology has also helped to reveal the facility and boundaries of past methods of 
natural inquiry. Recently, Marcos Martinón-Torres from University College London has 
led a team examining early modern laboratory remains in Europe and America. This 
work has made manifest the practicality of alchemy and the specific techniques and 
instruments which it entailed. Martinón-Torres, whose work represents a thoroughly 
interdisciplinary combination of history of science and archaeology, has shown that 
alchemy was not just an esoteric search for gold but incorporated mining, assaying and 
metallurgy more generally. He suggests studies of remains show that alchemists worked 
with materials previously thought to have only been synthesized in the twentieth century 
(Pinkowski 2004). Martinón-Torres has also addressed the question of how archaeology 
and the history of science might be better integrated. He has stressed the value of 
archaeometric techniques for examining processes of manufacturing and using laboratory 
instruments, to reveal international networks of production, distribution, and 
collaboration. He notes that makers’ marks can reveal unexpected connections, for 
example showing combinations of alchemical and freemasonic imagery on early modern 
objects (Martinón-Torres 2010; Martinón-Torres 2011). 
 
Medical archaeology also provides insights normally overlooked by historians working 
only with texts. Patricia Baker has pointed to the way archaeology enriches the 
geography of ancient Roman medicine. While texts may make practices appear 
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homogenous across the ancient Roman empire, excavations provide evidence of regional 
and local differences. Furthermore, considering contexts where Roman medical 
instruments have been found discloses much about their non-functional uses. Medical 
instruments found in rivers and graves suggest their use as votive offerings, samples of 
property, or as mediating objects between life and death (Baker 2002; Baker 2004a; 
Baker 2004b). Daniel Antoine notes that medical archaeology also offers a diverse array 
of resources for understanding the history of epidemics. Archaeological approaches may 
make possible the identification of disease hosts and vectors, reconstructions of the 
natural and urban environments and climatic conditions in which diseases spread between 
individuals, communities, or populations. Archaeology has also identified and dated 
burial sites of epidemic victims, and sheds light on the material practices and culture 
around burial or the disposal of bodies (Antoine 2008). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
These brief examples indicate the potential richness of archaeological approaches for 
developing further the history of science’s engagements with material culture. This 
chapter has explored how material culture became a focus in the history of science, what 
historians have been able to learn about the status of material culture as evidence, and 
how archaeology offers new resources and perspectives for taking these studies further. 
Historians of science have taken a growing interest in material culture in recent decades. 
They have shown how changing assessments and constructions of the human body and 
the material culture of buildings, instruments, models, and other apparatus have been 
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deeply implicated in defining what counts as scientific evidence and how it should be 
judged. Material evidence is always assessed within a complex of understandings of the 
nature of materials themselves (as natural or artificial, for example), about the status of 
materials as valid forms of evidence, and about the bodies of investigators and their 
credibility in making natural knowledge. These criteria have been constantly changing, so 
that what might appear as unassailable evidence in one context may soon become 
irrelevant to scientific knowledge in another. Judgments on all these matters are 
culturally and historically situated and variable. 
 
If the history of science has highlighted the historicity and fragility of material evidence, 
it nevertheless has much to learn if it is to fully appreciate the role of the material in the 
sciences. Against all that fragility is the hard materiality of things themselves. If, 
recalling the introduction to this chapter, Renfrew and Bahn overplay the significance of 
ideas in archaeology, then historians of science have surely underplayed the value of 
archaeology for their enterprise. As historians venture into a more general and broad 
appreciation of the material in science, archaeology offers them the opportunity to learn 
beyond the text, revealing new insights into the diverse uses, distributions, circulations 
and values given to materials and artifacts in the past. If things can talk, archaeology may 
help historians to listen more closely to what things have to say. 
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